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Zoning Ordinances
Within the last score of years there has been a remarkable growth of "zoning" legislation. Some features
of such legislation are as old as the United States itself
but, as a complete and comprehensive system for city improvement, it has had its main impetus in very recent years.
With the vast increase of industrial plants and their rapid
encroachments into lerritories which were previously residential sections has come a desire to keep them in segregated districts. As a result many cities have enacted these
so-called "zoning ordinances."
In the main, such ordinances provide for the diviaion
of the city into certain districts. They provide for heavy
industrial, light industrial, commercial, and often, two
classes of residential districts. In each district only buildings of certain construction may be built and to certain
uses only can these or old buildings be put. Other restrictions are included, such as yard space and building lines.
As an inevitable accompaniment to such legislation
has been the question of their validity. Owners, attempt-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
ing to build a forbidden building in one of the districts,
have of course claimed that the ordinances violate the guarantees of the Federal Constitution. Those portions of the
Constitution guaranteeing the equal protection of laws and
forbidding the taking of property without due process
have been their chief bulwarks. Consequently the reports
of practically every state contain one or more decisions
on this much mooted question. It is our purpose to examine some of these cases and to summarize the holdings
therein.
Certain axiomatic principles of law are to be found in
all the cases and require no citation of authority to uphold them. These principles deal with the police power
which is claimed by the municipalities to warrant such ordinances.
It is said that the police power of a state is its most
fundamental power and, at the same time, the most unlimited of its powers. There has been no exact definition of
police power and it is doubtless desirable that there should
be none so that its exercise under changed conditions
may not be hampered by an archaic definition enunciated
under dissimilar circumstances. But it necessarily has a
limit. The U. S. Supreme Court has said that it extends
not only to regulations promoting public health, morals,
and safety but to public convenience or general prosperity,
C., B., and Q. R. Co. vs. Ill., 200 U. S. 561. Such ordinances, being an exercise of validly delegated state police
power, are entitled to all the presumptions of validity to,
which state statutes are entitled. The ordinance must
clearly offend the higher guarantees of the Constitution
to justify the court holding it invalid. The ordinance
must, of course, have some reasonable relation to the promotion of the ends justifying the exercise of police power
and must not be unduly discriminatory or partial in operation.
First, let us examine those cases holding that such
ordinances are unconstitutional. Some few cases are to
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be found which base this decision on the ground that the
municipality had exceeded its charter power and not on
the violation of property rights of individuals. Such a case
is People ex rel. Friend vs. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16. The ordinance sought to prohibit the erection of retail stores in
residential neighborhoods. The court held that Illinois
had not delegated to the city the right to regulate on such
matters and that the attempted exercise of a non-delegated
power was invalid. Another case of the same import is
Clements vs. McCabe et al, 210 Mich 207. It was here
held that the power of zoning must be expressly given to
a municipality and that it is not an implied power from the
mere fact of creation of a municipality. To the same effect are Fitzhugh vs. Jackson, 132 Miss. 585; State vs.
McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1; and Smith vs. Hosford, 106 Kan. 363.
A rather unique situation is disclosed in Dorison vs.
Saul, 98 N. J. L. 112. Jersey City, by ordinance, attempted to compel the erection of at least 3-story buildings in
a certain area. The plaintiff sought a permit for a 2-story
dwelling and it was refused. The court held that the legislature in giving the city the right to "limit the height"
meant the right to define the maximum height buildings
might reach and not the minimum to which they must
reach. They consequently held the provision invalid.
A minority of the decisions will be found holding that
either the entire scheme of zoning or some of its features
are unconstitutional. But the most important and most
quoted of these cases will be seen to have been decided on
special grounds that may easily be avoided in a well-planned zoning scheme.
Such a case is Eubank vs. Richmond, 266 U. S. 137.
A statute of Virginia authorized councils of cities to make
regulations concerning the building of houses in the city,
to prescribe and establish building lines, etc. By virtue of
this act, the city council of Richmond passed an ordinance
providing that whenever the owners of two-thirds of the
property abutting on any street should, in writing, request
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the establishment of a building line, such line should be established not less than five feet nor more than thirty feet
from the street line. Such a request by two-thirds of the
owners on a particular street was presented and the line
established. Eubank was denied a permit to build in
front of the line. The Supreme Court of Virginia sustained the ordinance. They said that it was passed in the
interest of the health, safety, comfort and convenience
of the public and that the enactment tended to accomplish
some of these objects and was consequently a valid exercise of the police power. On appeal to the U. S. Supreme
Court, it pointed out that there was no discretion as
to whether the line should be established or not. Part of
the property owners could determine both the kind and
extent 9f use of the other owners. The ordinance created
no standard by which the power given was to be exercised.
The line might be established for their own interest or capriciously. It might even vary on different sides of the
same street or in different blocks. The only discretion
permitted was in the choice of from five to thirty feet.
The court thought it hard to understand how public comfort or convenience, much less public health, could be promoted by a line so "variously disposed." They accordingly
held that it was an unreasonable exercise of police power
and void.
Another celebrated case holding such an ordinance
unconstitutional is Spann vs. Dallas, 111 Texas 350. The
ordinance prohibited any business house within a residence
district except with the consent of three-fourths of the
property owners of the district. The court held that the
ordinance was clearly not a regulation for the protection of public health or safety. The business of a retail
store does not threaten public health nor endanger public
safety, neither does it impair public comfort nor is it injurious to public welfare. Even if harmful, it would not be
made less so by the consent of three-fourths of the adjoining property owners. The presence of this feature was
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doubtless largely instrumental in determining the court's
decision.
In Willison vs. Cooke, 54 Colo. 302, an ordinance of
Denver prohibited the erection of store buildings, factories, etc. in any block in a designated district without the
written consent of a majority of the owners of property in
the block fronting on the same street and when fifty per
cent. of the lots were improved, future buildings had to be
set back the average distance of those already built. The
court held that the regulations did not in any way tend to
promote the health, safety, or general welfare of the public and was therefore unconstitutional.
The most recent decision of the Penn'a. Supreme Court
is of similar import, Appeal of White, 134 Atl.-, (not yet
officially reported) decided on June 26, 1926. The city of
Pittsburgh, pursuant to statutory authority, passed a zoning ordinance. It provided a complete scheme to divide
the city into districts and to regulate the construction and
use of buildings therein. The pertinent part of section 32
relating to residence districts is as follows:
"First Area District-In this district the minimum dimensions of yards and other open spaces, and the area of
lot required per family houses thereon, shall be as follows:
"Front yard:
"(a) There shall be a front yard having a depth
of not less than fifteen (15) feet.
"(b) When the front walls of ighty (80) per
cent. of all the buildings on one side of the street between
two (2) intersecting streets have been kept back from the
street line, no building hereafter erected, or altered, shall
be placed nearer to the street line than the distance established by the majority of the eighty (80) per cent. at the
time of the passage of this ordinance. ..."
White enclosed an open porch at the front of his house,
converting it into a room, violating the ordinance. The
ordinance was upheld by the common pleas court and reversed on appeal by the Superior Court.
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The Supreme Court, by Justice Kephart, in a well
reasoned opinion, discusses the sphere of the police power
of the state, points out the distinction between police power and eminent domain, and the extent of judicial duty in
confining the exercise of police power to its proper ends.
The court, in speaking of the purpose of the ordinance, says, "The purpose of the ordinance is to bring about
an orderly development of cities, to establish districts into
which business, commerce, and industry shall not intrude,
and to fix certain territory for different grades of industrial concerns. Such limitations may, in a general sense,
be a reasonable exertion of the police power."
The court points out, however, that in the application
of its various parts, it must be tested by the principles before stated. The exercise of police power "must not be
from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation
of economic laws or for purely aesthetic considerations."
It is pointed out that the failure of dwellings to conform to a set-back line would not disturb the comfort of
the ordinary person; it is not offensive to the eye, nor a
source of sickness; it does not materially increase nor decrease the fire hazards. Such provisions are said to be
''regulation run mad."
The main defect of these provisions was in their discriminatory application. The line on one side of the street
might'vary by many feet from the line on the opposite
side. It might vary in different blocks in the same street.
Thus, where there had been but one building erected in
a block, all subsequent buildings would have to conform to
it, possibly depriving the owner of a short lot from making
any substantial use of his property. The court says, "It
applies only to one side of the street in blocks were 80
per cent. of the houses are already set back a uniform distance." This statement would seem to be erroneous from
a reading of that section of the ordinance found in the
opinion. All that is necessary to have the ordinance applicable to a certain block is that 80 per cent of all the build-
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ings on one side of the street have been kept back from
the street line but no requirement of uniformity of setback appears. The decision was that this portion of the
ordinance was unconstitutional. The case is closely analogous to Eubank vs. Richmond, supra.
Several other cases may be found deciding that such
ordinances, in whole or in part, are an unconstitutional exercise of police power.
In Fruth vs. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, a church
applied for a building permit and it was refused because
the church would encroach on an established building line.
It was held that the ordinance was based on mere aesthetic
grounds and had no reasonable reference to the safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the people at large
and was accordingly invalid.
The attitude of the Illinois courts may be seen in
People vs. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16. As dicta, the court said, in
speaking of the exclusion of retail stores from residential
districts, that there was no reasonable connection between
the proper objects to be accomplished by such an ordinance
and the means adopted to accomplish those ends.
The city of Buffalo enacted a zoning ordinance but
prescribed the districts by means of a certain radius from
the questioned building. In re Kensington-Davis Corp.,
239 N. Y. 54, (1924) decided that such an ordinance was
invalid as it was unjustly discriminatory in defining the
districts.
In State vs. Edgcomb, 108 Neb.-, (1922) the ordinance
provided that no building should be constructed in a certain district covering more than 25 per cent. of the lot
area. It was held invalid being unreasonable in having no
relation to the public health, safety, or welfare.
Numerous decisions of the New Jersey couits may be
found on this subject. Possibly the one most often cited is
Ignaciumus vs. Town of Nutley, 125 Atl. 121. Following
express legislative authority a zoning ordinance was
passed. A permit for a retail store in a residential dis-
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trict was sought and refused. The court said that the
presence of a store in a residential district could have no
effect on the public health or safety. General welfare does
not permit the prohibition of ordinary use of property because repugnant to the sentiments or desires of a particular
class in a neighborhood. This part of the ordinance was
held invalid.
In Goldman vs. Crowther, 128 Ati. 50, the Maryland
court, in 1925, decided that restrictions against businesses
in residence districts are wholly arbitrary and have no
logical relation to the public welfare but are based solely
on aesthetic grounds. Another indication of the Maryland
view is found in Byrne vs. Md. Realty Co., 129 Md. 202,
(1916) where an attempt to secure a permit to build a
semi-detached house was refused because the zoning ordinance forbade any but detached houses in that particular
district. The court held that it was an attempt to legislate of purely aesthetic purposes under the guise of police
power and was unconstitutional.
St. Louis vs. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, decided that a requirement that all buildings had to be set back at least 40 feet
from the street line was void as the taking of property
without compensation and was not a valid exercise of the
police power.
Other cases displaying similar views and holdings are:
State vs. Whitaker, 149 N. C. 542; Tighe vs. Osborne, 131
AtI. 801, (Md. 1926); Quintum vs. City of Bay, 64 Miss.
483; Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture School, 249
I1. 436; and State vs. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226.
There are certain portions of zoning ordinances which
have been upheld almost invariably in every jurisdiction.
Brice's Appeal, 89 Pa. 85, is illustrative of this. The provision was that every new dwelling should have attached
to it an open space of at least 12 feet square. The court in
upholding the act said that the object of the act was to secure and protect health and life, by furnishing each family
with a sufficient quantity of light and air and with a

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
reasonable facility for escape in case of fire. It Was held
that the means used were reasonable in securing that justifiable end.
Windsor vs. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, in a case deciding
that establishment of building lines by a municipality is
valid. The court held that such restrictions added to the
safety of travel, furnished better protection against fire,
and better light and air to those living on the street as well
as enhanced the value and beauty of the neighborhood.
State vs. Osborn, 22 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 549, decided
that a restriction against apartment houses in a residential
district was a valid exercise of police power.
Let us now look at those cases dealing with the general zoning ordinances and holding that such are constitutional.
One of the most frequently quoted of these is Welch
vs. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567. A statute of Mass.
had created certain districts and prohibited buildings beThe plaintiff
yond a certain height in those districts.
sought a permit to build one 124 feet in height in section
B where the limit was 80-100 feet. The State Supreme
Court refused a mandamus to compel the issuance of a
building permit.
The U. S. Supreme Court pointed out that the matter
of locality is very important in passing on questions of
validity and reasonableness of a discrimination or classification as to limitations in height. The state court had
held that the discrimination between the commercial and
residential districts had a reasonable basis in the very much
greater demand for space in a business or commercial district than where buildings are situated in residential districts and where no such reasons exist for high buildings.
The state court distinguished the case from Com. vs. Boston Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348, which holds that police power
cannot be exercised for a merely aesthetic purpose. The
condition used by the commission to determine the height
from 80-100 feet was that the height of the building was
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to be not more than twice the width of the street. This
was for the safety of adjoining buildings in view of the risk
of falling walls after a fire.
The Supreme Court said that it was not prepared to
hold the classification or discrimination to be so unreasonable that it deprived the owner of its profitable use without justification. The regulations were reasonable and
justified by the police power.
Another important and often-cited case upholding
zoning ordinances as systems is In re Opinion of Justices,
234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525. The court, in its advisory
opinion to the Legislature, held that an ordinance segregating manufacturing and commercial buildings from homes
and residences was justified by the broad conceptions of
police power. Aesthetic considerations alone, or as the
main end, do not afford sufficient foundation for the exercise of police power. Enhancement of artistic attractiveness of the city or town may be considered in exercising
power conferred only when the dominant aim in respect to
the establishment of districts, based on the use and construction of buildings, has primary regard to other factors
lawfully within the scope of police power. Then it may be
considered, not as the main purpose to be attained, but
only as subservient to another or main end recognized as
sufficient under the general principles governing the exercise of police power. The Justices point out the various legitimate reasons for zoning into districts: it decreases the fire risk; it renders ife more secure to those
living close by; the health and security from injury to
children and the aged and feeble and otherwise less robust
portion of the public is promoted by the separation of
dwellings and the territory of trade and industry; it aids
in the suppression and prevention of disorder; it facilitates
the extinguishment of fires; the enforcement of regulations
for street traffic is made easier; it expedites the transportation of workers; and the construction and repair of
streets is rendered easier and less expensive. Some of
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these aims would appear to be but slightly attained, if at
all, by zoning. But the Justices decided that the scheme
was a valid exercise of police power even though, later,
actual applications might develop into unconstitutional
acts.
The authority of this case has been assailed on the
ground that it was directly authorized by the Constitution of Mass. That fact, however, should derogate not at
all from its force as a persuasive precedent, since a state
constitution must not, any more than a state statute, transgress the guarantees of the Federal Constitution.
It was expressly decided not to violate the Federal
Constitution and has been given the persuasiveness that
all opinions of that court deserve.
One of the most forward-looking and progressive
cases is that of La. vs. Civello and City of N. 0., 154 La.
217 (1923). The question arose over that portion of a
zoning ordinance forbidding business establishments n
designated residence districts. The court said, "If by the
term 'aesthetic considerations' is meant a regard for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of beauty
of the neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason for saying that such consideration is not
a matter of public welfare. The beauty of a fashionable
residence neighborhood in a city is for the comfort and
happiness of the residents, and it sustains in a general way
the value of property in the neighborhood. It is, therefore, as much a matter of general welfare as is any other
condition that fosters comfort or happiness, and consequently values generally of the property in the neighborhood. Why should not the police power avail as well to
suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending
the sense of sight, as to suppress or prevent a nuisance
committed b yoffending the sense of hearing, or the olfactory nerves? An eyesore in a neighborhood of residences
might be as much a public nuisance, and as ruinous to property values in the neighborhood generally, as a disagreeable
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noise or odor, or a menace to safety or health. The difference is not in principle, but only in degree." The court
consequently upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of
police power.
Another such case is Ware vs. Wichita, 113 Kan. 155.
The court there said that there was an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which might be fostered within reason. Such legislation is merely a'liberalized
application of the general welfare purpose of State and
Federal Constitutions. The court had upheld assessments
on abutting owners for the planting of shade trees in front
of their properties. While not a case in point it does have
value in showing the court's bent toward such legislation.
Equally liberal in its attitude is the court in State vs.
Harper, 182 Wis. 148. "If such regulations stabilize the
value of property, promote the permanency of desirable
home surroundings, and if they add to the happiness and
comfort of the citizens, they thereby promote the general
welfare." The benefits of such enactments were enumerated: they attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the city;
they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize
the use and value of property; they promote the peace,
tranquility, and good order of the city. The court thought
the attainment of these objects a legitimate field for the
exercise of the police power.
Again, we find somewhat similar views expressed in
Miller vs. Board of Public Works, 234 Pac. 381, decided by
Cal. in 1925. The court held that zoning regulations were
a valid exercise of police power which was necessary to
subserve ends for which this power exists, namely: the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. The establishment of strictly private residential districts, from which are excluded and absolutely prohibited
apartments, tenements, general public enterprises and like
structures is a legitimate exercise of police power. It tends
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to promote and perpetuate the American home. Certain
business establishments, harmless in themselves, may become "near-nuisances" because of the character of the
neighborhood. The general welfare is the aggregate of
individual welfare and anything benefiting individual welfare will affect and promote general welfare. Such werethe pronounced and liberal views of the California court.
The correctness of the final statement may well be questioned.
Zahn vs. Board of Public Works, 234 Pac. 388, (Cal.
1925) is a similar case upholding a zoning ordinance which
permitted business establishments at frequent intervals in
the residential zone to provide for the immediate needs of
the neighborhood.
An example of the rather shifting attitude of the
Maryland courts is seen in Cochran vs. Preston, 108 Md.
220. Here the court says that although the weight of authority is that police power may not be exercised for
aesthetic purposes, yet it may be that, in the development
of a higher civilization, the culture and refinement of the
people has reached the point where the educational value of the fine arts, as expressed and embodied in
architectural symmetry and harmony, is so well recognized
as to give sanction, under some circumstances, to the exercise of this power even for such purposes. This liberal
viewpoint is followed by several more conservative holdings, supra.
State vs. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, (1920) illustrates the
condemnation of a certain use and the payment of compensation therefore. The ban was against an apartment house
in a residence district. The court pointed out that condemnation of additional width for streets, not to be used
for travel but for ornament and beauty had been upheld
as valid, In re City of N. Y., 167 N. Y. 624. It was decided that such an act did promote the public welfare,
that the use was therefore a public one and the act was
upheld. In State vs. Houghton, (Minn.) 204 N. W. 569, a
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zoning ordinance of Minneapolis was upheld as a valid
exercise of police power directly over-ruling their previous
decisions on the subject.
Additional cases upholding zoning ordinances as constitutional are: Richard vs. Zoning Board, (R. 1. 1925) 130
Atl. 802; DesMoines vs. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096;
Bacon vs. Walker, 27 Sup. Ct. 289; Lincoln Trust Co. vs.
Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313.
The attitude of the U. S. Supreme Court appears to
be rather liberal and favorable to holding these zoning
ordinances as a constitutional exercise of the police power.
True, they held such provisions invalid in Eubank vs. Richmond, supra, but the decision there was largely based on
the pernicious freedom allowed property owners in determining the regulations. Balanced against this decision are
several others displaying advanced liberality in the construction of police power. Such a case is Noble State
Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S. 111., where Justice Holmes
says, "Police power may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare." The case dealt
with a dissimilar situation yet the doctrine expressed is
equally applicable to zoning ordinances. Again in St.
Louis Poster Adv. Co. vs. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269, the
same Justice says, "Possibly one or two details, especially the requirement of conformity with building lines, have
aesthetic considerations in view more obviously than anything else. But as the main burdens imposed stand on
other grounds, we should not be prepared to deny the validity of relatively trifling requirements that did not look
solely to the satisfaction of rudimentary wants that alone
we generally recognize as necessary." While no definite
statement to the effect that police power cannot be exercised for aesthetic purposes alone can be found, indubitably they would so hold if such a decision were necessary to
decide a case. But we are safe in saying that the Su-
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preme Court's attitude is favorable to the constitutionality
of these general schemes for city planning.
No such general statement can be made concerning
the various State Supreme Courts. There is a hopeless
divergence in their views and holdings which time alone
may lessen. Those holding such ordinances constitutional
as a whole, make a more liberal construction of "general
welfare" or find hidden benefits to public health or safety
therein.
There would seem to be three classes of cases holding
that zoning ordinances, either wholly or partially, are
unconstitutional. The first are those cases based on the
lack of authority of the municipality to pass the ordinance
in question. The second, those holding a part of the ordinance unconstitutional because of the presence of discriminatory features such as allowing a certain portion of
the property owners to determine the regulations or failing to make a reasonable classification of districts. The
third are those decisions holding that such ordinances have
no reasonable tendency to promote the proper objects of
the exercise of police power as public health, safety or welfare.
The trend of the decisions is toward holding such ordinances, when purged of those defects enumerated in the
second class above, constitutional. When courts, having
the prestige and influence of the U. S. Supreme Court, and
the highest courts of Mass., N. Y., Pa. and Cal. indicate that
such enactments are a valid exercise of the state's police
power, it is readily imaginable that other courts will, in
time, likewise uphold them.

HAROLD SEATON IRWIN
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MOOT COURT
SUTTON'S ESTATE
Wills-Legacies--Restraint

of Marraze-Limtation-4ntentionRemainder.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
as
Z.
Z
on

Sutton devised the income of a fund to be paid to X, for his life,
long as he remained single. At his (X's) death it shall be paid to
After four years, X has married. Three years thereafter, X dies.
claims the fund. Sutton's heirs, or next-of-kin, claim the fund
the ground that the gift of the remainder was void.
P. Johnston, for Plaintiff.
Morris, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT

Householder, J. The first question to be decided, is whether
the gift of the income ol the fund, to X, "as long as he remains
single," was valid or void, as being in restraint of marriage.
In considering this question, we must ascertain what a man can
do with his own property. It has been held, as a well settled principle of law, in Pennsylvania, that a man has a right to do as he wishes
with his own, and that a donor may give with such conditions as he
pleases, and he may limit or condition any gift he may make of
property, subject only to the restriction that the condition shall not
be clearly illegal: See Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93; Stewart's Estate, 253 Pa. 280.
In this case, in order to hold the gift of the remainder void, the
bequest to X 'must be illegal. The bequest is said to be illegal because it is a devise upon a condition in restrain of marriage. The
words used by the testator were, "as long ai he remains single,"
which are words of limitation. It has been held that a bequest using
the words "as long" or "so long as," is one upon conditional limitation; i. e., a limitation of the time of enjoyment, defining and limit.
ing the interest given, and is not a condition in restraint of marriage,
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and therefore is a valid bequest: Hotz's Estate, 38 Pa. 422; Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93; Bruch's Estate, 185 Pa. 194.
This seems to be a rather flimsy and technical distinction, and
shows a steady tendency of the Pennsylvania courts, to recognize
and encourage exceptions to the rule which substantially annul the
rule itself. The practical effect of the limitation is to restrain marriage, but the tendency of the courts today is to allow a person as
much freedom in alienating his own property as possible. Two testators may make bequests, both having the same thought in mind,
but one may unwittingly use the word "on condition," while the other,
knowing the law, will say "as long as," and the bequest of the first
will be void, while the latter will be valid, although the practical effect is the same. Hotz's Estate, 38 Pa. 422.
The bequest being valid as a conditional limitation, we must next
determine whether Z is entitled to the fund, immediately upon X's
marriage, or if it lapses for want of a taker, and then goes to Sutton's next-of-kin.
The cardinal rule in the construction and interpretation of wills
is that the actual intention of the testator must be ascertained, and
if it is not in contravention of some established rule of law, or public
policy, it must be given effect; Patton's Estate, 79 Super. 314; -Iolbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93.
In this case, the testator intended that X should have the fund
as long as he remained single, which the testator probably expected
him to do, and if he should marry, since he had made no provision as
to where the fund should go, and as it is a reasonable presumption
that the next-of-kin should not have it, the fairest interpretation of
the testator's intention, is that he intended the fund to go to Z, immediately upon X's marriage. In the construction of wills, that
construction is favored which avoids intestacy. Intestacy will not
be adopted if the will can be reasonably interpreted otherwise, Philip's
Estate, 205 Pa. 504.
In Bruch's Estate, the facts were analagous to the case at bar,
with the exception that the bequest was to go to a specific fund
after the death of the original legatee. The court held, that as
there was no object to subserve by postponing the vesting, the fund
would vest immediately.
Therefore, in view of the foregoing reasons, judgment will be
entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the fund, with the income for three years, from the time of X's marriage, to the present
date.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
A gift of an income to one so long as he remains single, is valid.
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The fear of the loss of the income may deter him from marriage, but
the learned court below recognizes the discrimination made by the
authorities between a gift during singleness, and a gift provided
that the donee remains single, and properly characterizes it.
The gift to X was for his life, as long as he remained single;
that is, for so much of his life as shall be passed in an unmarried
state.
On X's marriage, the gift to him terminated. But the gift to Z
was to take effect at the death of X. While X's marriage ended
the gift to him, it did not begin the gift to Z. That was to occur
only on X's death. Since the testator made no provision for the interval between X's marriage and his death, he died intestate as to
that interval.
We might be disposed then, to modify the decree of the learned
court below by providing that the fund be paid to Z as from the time
of X's death but not to award to him the income for the three years.
Deference however to Buch's Estate, 185 Pa. 194 induces us to adopt
the decision of the learned court below. The decree of the 0. C. is
affirmed. Appeal dismissed.

COMMONWEALTH VS. TITUS
Criminal Law-Murder-Evidence--Dying Declarations-Res Gestae
-Sufficiency of Reason for Reversal-281 Pa.
41 Overruled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Titus is on trial for the killing of Henry. He met Henry and
Holland and attacked them both together, firing a shot first at
Henry, and within five minutes another at Holland. The death of
both resulted. Holland lived twenty minutes and before dying declared that Titus had shot both Henry and himself. The court admitted this as a dying declaration, and also as part of the res gestae.
Conviction. Appeal.
Meyer, for Commonwealth.
Rahn, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
•Keil, J. In the trial of Titus for the murder of Henry, the
statement of Holland was admitted on two grounds: as part of the
res gestae and as a dying declaration. We deem the law governing
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this case to be too well settled to allow any change in the rule. The
res gestae may cover quite a lengthy period of time depending entirely on the circumstances of the particular case, the rule being
stated that it constitutes the very fact which is the subject of inquiry and elucidates the facts with which it is connected; having been
made without premeditation and without a view to the consequences."
The statement in the case at bar was made within twenty-five minutes
of the killing and so falls clearly within the rule, Com. vs. Werntz,
161 Pa. 591; Com. vs. Puntario, 271 Pa. 501; Com. vs. Stallone, 281
Pa. 41.
It is uniformly held in all the cases in this jurisdiction that in
order to admit a statement as a dying declaration, the declarant
must be the person whose death is the subject of the charge, 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, No. 156a. A dying declaration is, at best, a species
of hearsay evidence, an exception to a rule stretching back almost to
a time "when the memory of man goeth not to the contrary.' The
court receives statements made by the deceased on the point of death
because there is little fear of prevarication; but at no time is such
evidence given the same weight as an assertion made on the witness
stand in open court. There still exists the drawback that there can
be no cross-examination and no opportunity to confront the witness
with the accused. To stretch this exception to cases where the reasons for its existence, frail as they are, are entirely lacking, is
neither a logical development of the law nor an application of' any
rule of justice.
There can be no doubt that the admission of the evidence was
predjudicial to the defendant. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved guilty and any evidence admitted tends to overcome this presumption.
We think the conclusions here reached to be sufficiently supported by Railing vs. Com., 110 Pa. 100; Com. vs. Brown, 264 Pa. 85;
Com. vs. Stallone, 281 Pa. 41, is exactly analogous to the instant case.
We do not conceive that the case of Brown vs. Com., 73 Pa. 321,
varies the rule laid down.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed and a new
trial granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The question is whether Holland's declaration, not made under
oath or cross-examination, but made within a half hour prior to his
death, was admissable.
The trial court thought is was on two grounds, (a) as part of the
res gestae, and (b) as a dying declaration. That is was not admiss-
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able as a dying declaration is clear, because the accused was not on
trial for the killing of him, as the authorities cited by the learned
court sufficiently show.
But, the court has decided that the declaration was part of the
res gestae, and we think, properly. But, if so, how was erro" committed on the reception of it? If a court assigns two reasons for
receiving a piece of evidence, one of which fully warrants the reception, the reception cannot be stigmatized as erroneous, because the
other reason assigned is inadequate.
We find no error then, in the reception of the evidence. A mistake in the reason stated does not make erroneous the receiving of it.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.

HOLLAND VS. STREET RAILWAY CO.
Negligence--Street Railways - Automobiles - Crossing-Excessivo
Speed-Anticipating-Contributory Negligence For Jury
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The railway crossed defendant's road. Its car was approaching
the crossing at a high rate of speed, at least forty miles on hour.
Holland, in an automobile, was moving along the road-about to
cross the railway. He stopped and looked and therefore saw the
approaching car-but calculating that it was moving at a usual speed
concluded that he could cross. He urged his automobile over the
track but the rear of it was struck by the car and Holland was killed.
His widow brings trespass for his death. Verdict for $5000 for his
widow.
Greer, for Plaintiff.
Keener, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Di Mona, J. A recovery of damages by the plaintiff must be based
upon two elements, the negligence of the defendant, and the absence
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
The negligence charged to the defendant is in driving his car at
an excessive rate of speed while approaching a crossing. It was the
motorman's duty to approach the crossing with his car under such
control that it could be stopped if danger was imminent. The fact
that the car was running on the company's private right of way and
not on a public highway did not relieve him of his duty for such is
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the law at intersecting highways, where the presence of traffic,
against the current of travel might be expected. This was announced
in Knobeloch vs. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 266 Pa. 140. At the trial the
jury found for the plaintiff. We may therefore assume that the jury
considered the question of the defendant's negligence and found it
negligent.
The second element, that of contributory negligence of the plaintiff is the only one in dispute in this appeal. The defendant contends that the plaintiff having stopped and seen the approaching car,
should have waited until the car had passed, before proceeding to
cross, and that his failure to await the passing of the car constituted
such negligence as to bar a recovery. It cannot be said that a person
is guilty of contributory negligence merely because he attempted to
cross a track on which a street car is approaching, If that were so
he could never attempt to cross a track in the crowded parts of a
city, where there is practically always an approaching car. The defendant's duty was to guard against injury from a car approaching
at an ordinary and reasonable speed, he was not bound to anticipate
and guard against the approach of a car driven at an excessive rate
of speed. He had a right to assume the motorman would exercise
reasonable care, and hold his car under control in approaching the
crossing. Suchy vs. Buffalo & Lake Erie Trac. Co., 283 Pa. 533;
Knobeloch vs. Pgh. Ry. Co., 266 Pa. 140.
The defendant's arguments is based upon the holding of Timber
vs. Phila. R. T. Co., 214 Pa. 475. We do not think this case to be of
much relevency to establish the plaintiff's negligence. What was
stated in Flounders vs. S. Pa. T. Co., 280 Pa. 85 is applicable here:
"Travel by automobile is much speedier than by horse drawn vehicles,
and a less time is required to make a crossing in safety by this means
of transportation than in the old way. Such matter must be taken
into consideration when determining contributory negligence."
Whether he was negligent in taking the course he did and in
crossing before the approaching car had passed was a question for
the jury.
We believe that the case was well decided in the court below, and
we therefore affirm the decision.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH VS. RICHARDS

Criminal Law-Murder--Confession-Evidence--Murder As
able Consequence of Crime Attempted-Common Act.

Prob.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richards and Jackson went together to X's store for the pirpose of robbing. They did not arrange for shooting on offer of violence. On arriving at the store, Jackson agreed to enter and rob
while Richards remained outside to give alarm if anyone threatened
to interfere. Jackson entered, but unexpectedly finding X inside, shot
and killed him. Prosecution for murder. A written confession of
Richards recited events of his life, involving, crime. He insisted that
this part of it should be ke pt from the jury. After this part was
excluded he objected to the use of the residue on the ground that
the whole of a confession must be read if any part of it. Verdict,
guilty. Motion for a new trial.
Mincemoyer, for Commonwealth.
Roth, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Wiest, J. The defendant's motion for a new trial must be denied. The defendant advances two reasons why he should be given
a new trial: first, because the evidence submitted did not warrant a
verdict of guilty of murder, and second because the court erred
in admitting any portion of the defendant's confession after having
excluded a portion of it because of its irrelevancy and incompetency.
To support his view that where one aids in the commission of
an unlawful act, he is not liable for the criminal acts of an associate
which are the outcome of the latter's sole violation, the defendant
relies on Com. vs. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361, and on State vs. Cannon
27 S. E. 526.
Commonwealth vs. Daley is to be distinguished from the case
at bar in that the act in which -the accomplices were participating in
that case was not an unlawful act. The case grew out of a riot which
followed a mass meeting during which riot a person was killed. The
court held that the purpose of the mob in assembling for the purpose
of holding a meeting was lawful.
The choice of State vs. Cannon by the learned counsel for the
defendant to support his contention was exceedingly unfortunate, for
the case is squarely opposed to the view he seeks to maintain. The
South Carolina court held in that case that "Where two persons are
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present, who are acting in concert for an unlawful purpose, and a
person is killed by one of them, in pursuance of the common design,
it matters not which fired the fatal shot."
The common law view of the liability of a defendant for a murder committed by an accomplice while the two are engaged in the
commission of an unlawful act is nicely stated in Wharton's Criminal Law, 8th Ed. Sect. 220: "It is not necessary that the crime
should be a part of the original design; it is enough if it be one of
the incidental probable consequences of the execution of that design,
and should appear at the moment to one of the participants to be
expedient for the common purpose. Thus, where A. and B. go out
for the purpose of robbing C., and A., in pursuance of the plan, kills
C., B. is guilty of murder."
The common law rule was adopted in this state in Com. vs. Major, 198 Pa. 290, where the court said: "It was not necessary that
there should have been any common purpose to kill A, B or anyone
else. If the killing was the probable consequence of the offense in
which the appellant and his companion were engaged, the appellant
was chargeable even though the killing was done by another in
execution of the common purpose."
We declare the rule in regard to the defendant's first point to
be as stated above, and that it must be applied to the facts in this
case. Richards joined Jackson for the purpose of committing a robbery, and it cannot be denied that a killing often results from the
commission of that felony. It is a matter of common knowledge,
through newspaper reports and other publicity given to such crimes,
that crime in this country is attended with killing in an appalling
number of cases. There is a great weight of authority in this and
other jurisdictions holding to the effect that the death of the victim
of a robbery is a probable and incidental consequence of that felony.
The second question in this case is: Did the court err in permitting the admission of a part of a confession after the defendant had
successfully objected to the admission of another portion because of
its irrelevancy and incompetency?
We affirm the general rule as universally applied, that the
whole of a confession must be placed in evidence if any portion of
it is to go in. But there is authority for the court's action in this
instance in allowing a portion of the confession to be admitted after
another portion had been excluded at the insistence of the defendant. A case exactly in point is Commonwealth vs. Comporto, 233
Pa. 10. In that case the court declared: "It would be mere trifling
to accede to his request to exclude a portion of the confession, and
then permit him to make the favor a ground of objection against
the admission of the remainder of the confession, because it no longer
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contained the whole of it. When he was permitted to object successfully to the admission of a portion, he must be regarded as having waived his right to the application of the general rule which requires the whole of it to go in. We do not say there was any error
in excluding a portion of the confession at the instance of the defendant, but if there was, the defendant's counsel cannot complain of it.
Pantall vs. Coal & Iron Co., 204 Pa. 158; Bingham's Appeal, 123 Pa.
262."
This exception to the general rule applies 'directly to this case.
The reason for the existence of the exception is almost self-evident.
Without it, it would be extremely difficult to introduce any confession in evidence. By the strict construction of the general rule, a
defendant could secure the exclusion of any confession he might make
merely by putting into it some irrelevant and incompetent matter.
There is nothing in the argument of the learned counsel for the
defendant to sustain the motion for a new trial. In view of the foregoing authorities and reasons, it must be denied.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Nothing need be said by us to vindicate the result of the reflections and reasoning of the learned court below.
Affirmed.

HUBER VS. TAYLOR
Negligence--Automobiles--Hiring Out Trucks--Leasing-Liability of
Lessor and Lessee-281 Pa. 16 Followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
X was in the business of letting out trucks to various persons.
He supplied the chauffeurs over whose acts the borrower had no
control, except to direct where he was to go and what articles he
should carry. Taylor hired a truck thus operated by a chauffeur
furnished by X. By the negligence.of this chauffeur in operating
this truck, William Huber, the plaintiff, was run into and seriously
hurt. This is trespass for damages. Plaintiff contends that the
chauffeur's negligence is to be attributed to Taylor for whom the
truck was being operated. Verdict for $1500.
Schechter, for Plaintiff.
Williams, for Defendant.
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contained the whole of it. When he was permitted to object successfully to the admission of a portion, he must be regarded as having waived his right to the application of the general rule which requires the whole of it to go in. We do not say there was any error
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OPINION OF THE COURT
Zakun, J. The appellant contends that it was error to attribute
the negligence of the chauffeur to Taylor. The question to be considered is whether the chauffeur at the time of the accident was
the servant of Taylor or of X.
It is a well established doctrine in the law that one is only
liable to a third person, injured by the act or omission of his workman, when the relation of master and servant exists at the time of
the act complained of, Connor vs. McCandless, 84 Pa. 307. If that
relation- does not exist the rule of "respondeat superior" cannot apply.
X was engaged in the business of hiring out trucks and supplied
the chauffeurs as part of the hiring and retained all control over the
chauffeur. Taylor, who hired the truck, was merely a bailee and as
such is not answerable for the negligence of the driver unless he has
in some way assumed control of, or interfered with, the manner in
which the vehicle was operated. The direction to carry the goods of
the lessee to a certain destination does not constitute such control
or interference, Funston vs. Ingenito, 282 Pa. 124. The real test
as to who is the master of the servant is-who exercised control over
him. In the case of Matlock vs. Chalfant, 69 Super. 49, which is in
point with the case at bar, the court said, "If the bailee can't discharge the driver and has no authority over him, except to direct
him where he shall drive, the owner is liable for an injury caused to
a third person by the negligent act of the chauffeur occurring during the period of hire, if the bailee has not interfered with the operation of the car." In the case before us X, the owner, and not
Taylor, the hirer, had control over the chauffeur and the operation
of the car, Dunmore vs. Padden, 262 Pa. 436, and Taylor in no way
interfered with such control.
It is clear that the learned court below erred in sustaining the
plaintiff's contention that the chauffeur's negligence is attributable
to Taylor and the verdict for the plaintiff must therefore be set
aside.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
In Thatcher vs. Pierce, 281 Pa. 16, it is said by Mr. Justice Kephart, "where one is engaged in the business of 'hiring out' trucks, and
furnishing a driver as part of the hiring, when an accident happens
in the course of that hiring, the owner of the truck is liable in damages. " "The lessee of such truck is not liable in damages to a person who is struck by the truck, although it was carrying the goods
of the lessee," syllabus of Connor vs. McCandless, 84 Pa. 307.
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Though the truck is doing the work of the lessee, it is also doing
the work of the lessor, who owns it and who lets out the use of
it, and the services of a chauffeur, to persons. There is no specific
reason for making two persons liable to the person injured by an
accident, nor for preferring the lessee to the lessor. Since the rule
stated above has been adopted though it has an element of arbritrariness there is no adequate reason for rejecting it, or choosing
the lessee rather than the lessor to be the bearer of the damages.
Th judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH VS. BRIGGS
Criminal Law-Murder--Charge of Court-Degree-Intention-In.
toxication-Question for Jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Murder. Briggs offered evidence that he was exceedingly drunk,
at the time of the altercation with the deceased, Stone. He asked the
court to say that, (a) a man could be so drunk as to be unable to conceive and intend the death by violence of another; (b) and that if
Briggs was in this state and degree of drunkenness when he inflicted
the blow which caused death, he could not properly be found guilty
of murder of the first degree. The court refused. Verdict of murder of the first degree. Appeal.
Dougherty, for Commonwealth.
Beatty, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Curtis, A., J. The argument in defendant's behalf for a reversal is based upon error of the learned court below in refusing
to make the following charges: (1) a man could be so drunk as to
be unable to conceive and intend the death by violence of another;
(2) and that if Briggs was in this state and degree of drunkenness
when he inflicted the blow which caused death, he could not properly
be found guilty of murder of the first degree. It is our opinion that
the said instructions would be correct if the defendant relies upon
his intoxication, and the burden is on him to furnish evidence of it
and the degree of it necessary to reduce the grade of the crime.
The general rule is, that voluntary drunkenness is no defense,
but voluntary drunkenness may be of such a degree as to make the
murderer incapable of entertaining the specific intent to kill, there-
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by reducing the grade of the offense from that of first degree murder, to murder of the second degree. As has been aptly said, "The
legal effect of drunkenness most frequently contended for is its reduction of murder from what would, without it, be of the first degree, to the second degree. The mental state accompanying drunkenness may involve the inability to deliberate, premeditate, and intend the death of the person whom the defendant's act has killed; or
perhaps the actual absence of deliberation, premeditation and intention. It may involve neither. Trickett on Criminal Law Vol. II
p. 738.
But "the presumption of mental capacity and sanity stands until
it is overcome by a fair preponderation or weight of evidence."
Therefore, if the defendant relies on his intoxication, the burden is
upon him to furnish evidence of it and the degree of it necessary to
reduce the grade of the crime from murder of the first degree to
murder of the second degree." Trickett, Vol. II, p. 740.
In the case before us, this rule is especially applicable because
the mere fact that the defendant had been exceedingly drunk at the
time of the altercation with the deceased and the killing of the latter,
would not alter the grade of the crime unless his intellect was so subverted as to negative the formation of a specific intent to kill.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Walker, 283 Pa. 468, which
is cited by counsel for both sides, the court stated that the mere
intoxication of the defendant at the time of the killing will not excuse
or palliate his offense unless he was in such a state of intoxication as
to be incapable of conceiving any intent to kill. If he was, the
grade of his offense is reduced to murder of the second degree.
The argument of the Commonwealth in our case is that, if the
defendant had sufficient presence of mind to wage the fight with
the deceased, if he was able to maneuver the weapon with which
he inflicted the fatal blow, he was not so intoxicated that he could
not form the necessary intent to kill the deceased, because if the
defendant had been so intoxicated that he could not form the necessary intent to kill, he could not have synchronized muscular and mental systems so as finally to have inflicted the blow which proved
fatal. With this argument we do not agree for the specific reason,
which is of common knowledge, that alcoholic stimulants may affect
certain parts of the human system while at the same time other parts
may not at all be affected.
The only evidence of the defendant's degree of drunkenness
specified in the facts is that he was exceedingly drunk at the time
of the altercation with the deceased. This does not prove to us
that the defendant was so drunk as to be incapable of conceiving the
necessary intent to kill, nor that he did have the necessary intent to
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kill because observation of human experiences with intoxicating
stimulants has shown us that some persons are easily reduced to a
state of mental lethargy by a few drinks of the intoxicant, while
others through protracted adaptation are not so affected until there
has been an excessive indulgence in the same.
Therefore we are of the opinion that the learned court below
erred in refusing to charge the jury as stated, and the motion for a
new trial is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The trial court was asked to state in substance that if the defendant was unable to conceive and intend the death of the person
whom he is accused of killing, he is not guilty of murder of the
first degree. As the killing did not occur in the commission or attempt to commit robbery, etc., the intention to kill was necessary
to make the killing murder of the first degree. The next question is
whether the defendant was incapable of intending death, and whether
that incapability could be produced by intoxicants. Whether men
can be so drunk as to be incapable of a certain intention, seems
hardly to be a question of law. But the experience and observation
of the jurors would be as good a source of information as any
accessible to the judge. The judge must allow the jury to answer
the question whether a certain degree of drunkenness destroys the
power to intend the death of another by violence.
The grant of a new trial is well vindicated by the satisfactory
opinion of the learned court below. Affirmed.

COHEN VS. DATES
Covenants-Release
Deed.-.Covenants--Restrictions---Peraonal
Restriction-273 Pa. 265 Followed.

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris owned six contiguous lots, one of which he contracted to
sell to Cohen. The deed contained the provision that no building
was to be put on the lot nearer to the building line than eight feet.
Harris subsequently sold the next lot to Perkins, the deed contained
a similar restriction. Ten years thereafter, for the price of $500
Harris released to Cohen the restriction on his lot. Cohen then contracted to convey in fee without incumbrances of any kind, to Dates
for $10,000. Dates contends that the building restriction when re-
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kill because observation of human experiences with intoxicating
stimulants has shown us that some persons are easily reduced to a
state of mental lethargy by a few drinks of the intoxicant, while
others through protracted adaptation are not so affected until there
has been an excessive indulgence in the same.
Therefore we are of the opinion that the learned court below
erred in refusing to charge the jury as stated, and the motion for a
new trial is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The trial court was asked to state in substance that if the defendant was unable to conceive and intend the death of the person
whom he is accused of killing, he is not guilty of murder of the
first degree. As the killing did not occur in the commission or attempt to commit robbery, etc., the intention to kill was necessary
to make the killing murder of the first degree. The next question is
whether the defendant was incapable of intending death, and whether
that incapability could be produced by intoxicants. Whether men
can be so drunk as to be incapable of a certain intention, seems
hardly to be a question of law. But the experience and observation
of the jurors would be as good a source of information as any
accessible to the judge. The judge must allow the jury to answer
the question whether a certain degree of drunkenness destroys the
power to intend the death of another by violence.
The grant of a new trial is well vindicated by the satisfactory
opinion of the learned court below. Affirmed.

COHEN VS. DATES
Covenants-Release
Deed.-.Covenants--Restrictions---Peraonal
Restriction-273 Pa. 265 Followed.

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Harris owned six contiguous lots, one of which he contracted to
sell to Cohen. The deed contained the provision that no building
was to be put on the lot nearer to the building line than eight feet.
Harris subsequently sold the next lot to Perkins, the deed contained
a similar restriction. Ten years thereafter, for the price of $500
Harris released to Cohen the restriction on his lot. Cohen then contracted to convey in fee without incumbrances of any kind, to Dates
for $10,000. Dates contends that the building restriction when re-
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leased is insufficient to terminate it as an encumbrance. The court
decides that the restriction is extinct and that Cohen is entitled to
the purchase money.
Brown, for Plaintiff.
Cramer, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Auerbach, J. The very common purpose of restrictions as to the
use of property conveyed is to benefit land retained by the grantor,
the difficulty in this class of cases being to distinguish between agreements for the benefit of the land itself, and agreements for the
grantors own benefit. In the former type of case, the benefit of the
restriction and the right of enforcing it runs with the land and
passes with it. In the latter type of case, the right of enforcing the
restriction is personal to the grantor. Having determined this question, we can then pass upon the efficacy of the release given by the
grantor in this case.
In the absence of an expression as to purpose of the creation
oif the rectriction, the rule for determining the purpose is to determine the intention of the parties to the covenant; and to ascertain such intent, resort may be had to the words of the covenant read
in the light of the surroundings of the parties and the subject of the
grant. Such is the rule laid down in the case of DeSano vs. Earle,
273 Pa. 265, and reiterated in numerous other cases in this jurisdiction. An examination of the cases discloses that a failure to stipulate
that the restriction is for the benefit of the land retained; the absence of a general plan or scheme of development; the failure to
state that subsequent grantees of the land retained shall participate
in the benefits and enforcement of the restriction, none of these alone
are an absolute criterion of the parties intent, 37 L. RL A. (n. s.)
note p. 15.
On the other hand, it has been held that a restriction as to erection of buildings on a lot conveyed from a larger tract ran with the
land and inured to the benefit of" subsequent purchasers of the land
retained, Harmon vs. Burow, 263 Pa. 188. And the fact that lots
in the same tract were sold subject to similar restrictions raised a
presumption that the covenant was made for the benefit of the lot
owners, and grantees of platted lots under a common form of deed
with like restrictions are each entitled to the benefit thereof.
Bearing in mind these past constructions placed upon the varying circumstances, let us examine the facts in this case to determine,
if possible, the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restriction.
Harris was the owner of six contiguous lots which he was desirous
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or willing to sell. The presence of such restrictions as in the present case, if made uniform and general throughout a neighborhood
or tract, enhance the value of the lots. This consideration alone
would explain the insertion of the restriction. Furthermore, it
does not appear that Harris himself resided on the tract, and in the
absence of such a fact we cannot imagine that such a covenant
would be of any value to him personally except as it would increase
the value of the land retained by him for future sale. In our mind,
the present case was clearly one of a covenant imposed for the
benefit of the land retained; running with the land, and inuring to
the benefit of subsequent purchasers of the land. We are fortified
in this holding by the decisions referred to above, and particularly
by the case of Rabinowitz vs. Rosen, 269 Pa. 482.
Since the restriction was imposed for the benefit of the land, it
passes as appurtenant to the land, and subsequent assignees can enforce the restriction, 13 Cyc. 715; Pittsburgh Coal Co. vs. Bank, 16
Dist. 857.' Since the grantor's rights under the covenant passed to
subsequent assignees of the land retained, it clearly was impossible
for Harris to release a right he no longer had (at least so far
as Perkins' lot was concerned) and the release of the grantor was
ineffectual to bar the rights of subsequent assignees, Fogal vs. Swat,
37 Super. 217.
Judgment of the court below is reversed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The defendant has stipulated for a title without incumbrances
of any kind. He refuses to accept that which is offered him, on
the ground that he will be restrained from building within eight feet
of the building line. His grantor is Cohen, the deed to whom from
Harris stipulated that no building should take place within these eight
feet. Such restriction adheres to the successive owners of the lot
and if it is still operative, Dates will not obtain the title for which he
has stipulated. It is said however that it may be extinguished by the
act of Harris, and that his release of it has thus put an end to it.
We fail to see cause for holding that the restriction may not be
extinguished by Harris. There was no general plan applicable to the
six houses. Lot number 1 was possibly occupied by Harris. At all
events when he sold lot number 2 he imposed the building restraint
on his vendee. What shows that it was for the benefit of anyone but
himself? He later sells lot 3 with a similar provision. The other 3
lots do not seem to have been sold. We cannot infer from these two
sales of lots, any intention other than to secure to Harris' lot number
1 whatever advantages and amenities might accrue from the absence
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of buildings within the eight feet. The proximity of these lots to
No. I could make the constrictions on them affect the value and the
pleasurableness of life on lot No. 1. There is no particular form to
be shown to these restrictions. Mr. Justice Frazer remarks, "Such
restrictions are not formed by the law, and the courts will not recognize implied rights, or extend covenants by implication ;" DeSanno
vs. Earle, 273 Pa. 265. We think the object of Harris must be taken,
in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, to promote
his own comfort and satisfy his own taste. We have no evidence that
Perkins, in buying the third lot, was influenced by the belief that
the neighboring building would stand eight feet back from the
building line. Nor is there evidence that the building on lot No. 1
is so situated.
We incline then to the opinion that since the stipulation was
not inserted in a series of deeds for the common benefit of the
grantors, but was for the benefit of Harris, as owner of the No. I
lot, he could release the owner of lot 2 from the limitation. Hence
the plaintiff may enforce the contract against the defendant and
the judgment must be reversed.
LYTLE VS. HARGEST
Contract-Action for Breach-Indivisible Contract-Two Suits-Ac.
qulesence as Allowing Second Action-266" Pa.
113 Distinguished
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lytle orally contractetd with Hargest to cut down the trees on
a tract of land belonging to Hargest, at a certain price per tree. The
time of payment was not specified. After cutting down one hundred
trees, he sued for the price and recovered. He continued to cut until
one hundred more were landed, when he brought a second suit to
recover for the second hundred so cut. Defendant proved the former
action and the court below non-suited him, upon proof of the earlier
recovery. Plaintiff now appeals from the decision of the lower court
in the second action, assigning as error such non-suit.
Bonno, for Plaintiff.
Miss Bogar, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Berger, J. The main question arising out of the case as stated
above is whether the oral contract entered into between the parties
was intended to be divisible, or indivisible. If the contract is intended to be entire, the recovery in the first suit bars recovery in the
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second. If divisible, as the plaintiff contends, then he was improperly non-suited. But how are we to determine this question? In
the case of Lucesco Oil Co. vs. Brewer, 66 Pa. 351, this proposition
of law was laid down as regards the divisibility or indivisibility of
a contract: "The entirety of a contract depends on the entireness of
the consideration, or its express, or implied apportionment to the
several items constituting its subject. If the consideration is single,
the contract is entire, whatever the number or variety of the items
may be, but if the consideration is apportioned expressedly or impliedly to each of the items, the contract is several."
Let us then apply this test to the case in question. Was the
consideration at a certain price per tree to apply to each tree as it
was felled, or was it to apply to each of the trees only when the
entire tract of trees was levelled, and then and not until then could
the contract price be handed over.
From the meager facts on hand, we have no way of saying on
which intention the parties acted. We believe the actual construction
of the agreement would have been best inferred from the evidence
and the curcumstances surrounding the making of the contract.
This we believe was for the proper consideration of the jury. Furthermore, in the case of Rugg & Bryan vs. Moore, 110 Pa. 236, the
same principle of law as was expressed in Lucesco Oil Co. vs. Brewer,
supra, was upheld and the court went even further to say that:
"Whether a contract is severable or not, is to be determined from
its terms and surrounding circumstances."
In the present case, since the contract was by parol and its terms
in dispute, we believe it was a proper question for the jury to decide, and the non-suiting of the plaintiff in the court below was
error.
Accordingly, we order that the judgment be reversed and a
venire facias de novo awarded.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The contract was to cut down all the trees on the tract. It was
a single contract, embracing a multitude of actions. The cutting
down of 100 trees was only part performance, and the plaintiff had
no right then to be paid at a certain rate per tree. He was entitled
to payment only at the completion of his performance. But, the defendant did not defend on the ground that nothing was yet due, as
he might have done. A recovery of the price of cutting for each of
the hundred trees was permitted. Continuance of performance after
such recovery, seems to have been acquiesed in by the defendant.
We think he" has assented to the division of the contract, as far as
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the cutting of the first 100 trees is concerned and that a suit can be
sustained for the continued cutting. Possibly, the defendant will
not be percluded from defending successfully any later action, that
has failed to embrace all the remainder of the work after the cutting
of the first 100 trees. 'See Onhaltzer vs. Bonedum, 266 Pa. 113;
Thompson vs. Graham, 246 Pa. 202.
Affirmed.

